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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
IN RE GOOGLE, INC. PRIVACY POLICY 
LITIGATION
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 5:12-cv-001382-PSG
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
(Re:  Docket No. 105)
 You might think that after three years of complaints, motions to dismiss, orders on motions 
to dismiss, leave to amend, amended complaints and more, at least the fundamental question of 
Plaintiffs’ Article III standing to pursue this suit would be settled.  You might think that, but you 
would be wrong.1
 For no less than the fourth time, Defendant Google, Inc. moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
complaint.  In the wake of the court’s orders on Google’s previous motions to dismiss,2 only two 
                                                          
1 Google also moves for summary judgment based on the absence of factual dispute as to the use of 
bandwidth or electricity for transmission or payments.   See Docket No. 105 at 13.  The court need 
not reach the parties’ summary judgment arguments to resolve the issue of Plaintiffs’ standing.  But 
even if that were not the case, because Plaintiffs offer no evidence that any personal information 
was ever transmitted from any Android device to any third-party developer, summary judgment in 
Google’s favor would be required. 
2 See Docket Nos. 45, 67, 85. 
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claims remain:  breach of contract and fraudulent unfair competition.  Plaintiffs bring both claims 
on behalf of an “app disclosure” subclass.  In granting Google’s third motion to dismiss, the court 
previously held that Plaintiffs’ only alleged injury-in-fact was the depletion of battery and 
bandwidth resulting from systemic, repeated transmission of personal information from Android 
devices to third-party developers.3  But in taking the leave the court granted to amend their claims, 
Plaintiffs managed something somewhat unusual:  they pled themselves out of a case.  Because 
injury-in-fact is now insufficiently alleged, especially as Plaintiffs claim injury without alleging 
any actual disclosure to third parties from Plaintiffs’ own devices, the court GRANTS Google’s 
motion to dismiss, without further leave to amend. 
I.
“To establish Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or 
imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’”4  The 
injury required by Article III may exist by virtue of “statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of 
which creates standing.”5  In such cases, the “standing question . . . is whether the constitutional or 
statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the 
plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”6  At all times the threshold question of standing “is 
distinct from the merits of [a] claim” and does not require “analysis of the merits.”7  The “standing 
                                                          
3 See Docket No. 85 at 13-14.
4 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson 
Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). 
5 Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 500 (1975)); see also Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 2014) cert. granted,
135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015).
6 Id.
7 Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the 
particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.”8
This is a putative nationwide class action brought by Plaintiffs Michael Goldberg, Robert 
DeMars and Scott McCullough against Google on behalf of all persons and entities in the United 
States that purchased at least one paid Android application through the Android Market and/or 
Google Play Store between February 1, 2009 and May 31, 2014.9
Google is a technology and advertising company that provides free web-based products to 
billions of consumers around the world.10  Free products are not, however, truly free.  Google 
requires massive amounts of revenue to sustain itself.  To generate revenue from advertising, 
Google logs personal identifying information, browsing habits, search queries, responsiveness to 
ads, demographic information, declared preferences and other information about each consumer 
that uses its products.  Google then uses this information to place advertisements tailored to each 
consumer while the consumer is using any Google product or browsing third-party sites that have 
partnered with Google to serve targeted ads.11
Google always has maintained a general or default privacy policy purporting to permit 
Google to “combine the information you submit under your account with information from other 
services.”12  This would allow Google, for example, to associate a consumer’s Gmail account (and 
therefore his or her name and identity, his or her private contact list or the contents of his or her 
                                                          
8 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (emphasis removed) (quoting Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)); see also Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 
1115, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2010).
9 See Docket No. 103 at ¶ 1.  Unless otherwise stated, facts cited come from Plaintiffs’ 
consolidated third amended complaint. 
10 See id. at ¶ 2. 
11 See id. at ¶ 4. 
12 See id. at ¶ 6.
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communications) with the consumer’s Google search queries or the consumer’s use of other 
Google products like Android, YouTube, Picasa, Voice, Google+, Maps, Docs and Reader.13  But 
before March 1, 2012, this general policy was qualified, limited and alleged to be contradicted in 
privacy policies associated with specific Google products, including both Gmail and Android-
powered devices.  The privacy policies associated with Android-powered devices, for example, 
specified that, although the default terms would generally apply, “[c]ertain applications or features 
of your Android-powered phone may cause other information [that is, other than certain delimited 
“usage statistics”] to be sent to Google but in a fashion that cannot be identified with you 
personally” and that “[y]our device may send us location information (for example, Cell ID or GPS 
information) that is not associated with your [Google] Account.”14  These categories of 
information, and certain other discrete categories of Android user information identified by the 
terms of the Android-powered device policy in effect prior to March 1, 2012, could not be 
“combine[d] . . . with information from other services.”15  On March 1, 2012, Google replaced 
these various policies with a single, unified policy that unequivocally allows Google to comingle 
user data across accounts and disclose it to third-parties for advertising purposes.16
This brings us to the activity now in dispute.  Google Play, formerly known as the Android 
Market, is the primary gateway for Android users to acquire, purchase and download apps and 
other digital media for their Android devices.17  The process of purchasing an app requires multiple 
components, including the creation of a Wallet account, the request for the app and the creation of 
                                                          
13 See id. at ¶ 5.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See id. at ¶¶ 7-12. 
17 See Docket No. 103 at ¶ 64. 
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a record of the purchase for the Developer Console.18  To create a Wallet account, a user must have 
a Google account and provide his or her name, usename, country and zip code.19  The request of an 
app consumes resources including electric power, CPU cycles, main memory and network capacity 
or bandwidth.20  In the Checkout Merchant Center, operative from February 2009 to early 2013, 
and the Play Developer Console, operative from 2012 to May 2014, a purchase of a paid 
application through the Android Market/Google Play Store allowed the app developer to access the 
purchaser’s name, email address and course address, or “the physical or geographical location 
associated with the Play account and/or the Android device used to download the application.”21
Google stopped making available purchaser details (including name and email address) to app 
developers in May 2014.22  But Google has continued to process app purchase transactions, to 
maintain user accounts and otherwise operate normally since May 2014.23
                                                          
18 See id. at ¶ 136. See also Docket No. 108-6, Ex. D at 80-93; id. at 83 (“The device calls the DFE 
[Device Frontend] CommitPurchaseAction.  The DFE sends a DeliveryInfoRequest to the Mixer, 
which sends it via the VCA to IMAS, which returns the AndroidAppDeliveryData including the 
secure URL for the actual download.  In parallel the DFE sends a CompletePurchaseRequest to the 
Blixer.  This inserts an Order into Checkout and then waits for status to indicate that the purchase 
has succeeded (or failed).  It then sends a PNR [PurchaseNotificationRequest] via the VCA to 
IMAS, which updates the purchase record in the user profile.”) (emphasis added); id. at 85 
(/commitPurchase also “[c]opies purchase context data (the details of the order to be created) into a 
CompletePurchaseRequest and sends it to the Blixer, with skip delivery set true.  The data sent 
includes the ‘risk hashed device info,’ an obfuscated device identifier (e.g. IMEI) sent by the 
device, and information about any challenges the user has passed (e.g., providing their Gaia 
password).”).
19 See Docket No. 105-10 at ¶¶ 6-8. 
20 See Docket No. 103 at ¶ 68; Docket No. 108-6, Ex. B at 3, 5-6; (“The process of completing a 
purchase in the store now branded as Google Play consumes limited resources local to or used by 
the purchaser’s device.”). 
21 See Docket No. 103 at ¶ 67.   Although the complaint makes passing reference to “transmission” 
of this information rather than mere access, Plaintiffs’ opposition confirms that the gravamen of its 
complaint is about access alone.  See Docket No. 108-4 at 2-4. 
22 See Docket No. 108-6, Ex. C at 81:13-19. 
23 See Docket No. 108-4 at 5. 
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 Plaintiffs’ original complaint alleged that Google violated both its prior policies and 
consumers’ privacy rights, but the court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not 
plead facts sufficient to show concrete economic harm or prima facie statutory or common law 
violations.24  “[N]othing in the precedent of the Ninth Circuit or other appellate courts confers 
standing on a party that has brought statutory or common law claims based on nothing more than 
the unauthorized disclosure of personal information.”25  Plaintiffs’ first consolidated amended 
complaint expanded the bounds of the alleged class and the explanations of Plaintiffs’ injuries, but 
the court dismissed for failure to plead sufficient facts to support any of their claims.26  Plaintiffs’ 
second consolidated amended complaint added allegations of Google’s Emerald Sea plan, but 
effectively alleged the same harms as before.27
 After Google’s third motion to dismiss, two claims remained:  an “app disclosure subclass” 
breach of contract claim and the subclass’s fraudulent unfair competition claim.  The court ruled 
that Plaintiffs could proceed on those two causes of action alone, although it later granted 
Plaintiffs’ motion to file a consolidated third amended complaint to “trim” their allegations.28  In 
addition to adding Goldberg as a plaintiff, the CTAC (i) dropped any allegations relating to 
Google’s use of the personal information of Android users that obtained free applications, as
distinguished from paid applications, from Google; and (ii) revised the class period.29  The class 
now is limited to Android users that purchased paid apps through the Android Market/Google Play 
                                                          
24 See Docket No. 45 at 8-10.
25 In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., Case No. 12-cv-01382-PSG, 2012 WL 6738343, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012). 
26 See Docket No. 67 at 18-30. 
27 See Docket No. 68. 
28 See Docket No. 85 at 27-28; Docket No. 97 at 1; Docket No. 101. 
29 See Docket No. 97 at 1.
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Store between February 1, 2009 and May 31, 2014.30  This class period represents the period of 
time during which Google allegedly and knowingly disclosed to third parties the names, email 
addresses and account location information belonging to each Android user that purchased a paid 
app through the Android Market/Google Play Store, in direct contravention of its express promises 
that it would not do so.31
II.
 This court has subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d), in part because the aggregated claims of the individual class members exceed the sum or 
value of $5,000,000.32  The parties further consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned 
magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).33
 The plaintiff always bears the burden of establishing standing.34  Where the plaintiff lacks 
standing, a complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(1).35  In reviewing such a motion, the court “is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, 
but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes 
concerning the existence of jurisdiction.”36  To successfully oppose a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the 
nonmovant must put forth “the manner and degree of evidence required” by the particular “stage[] 
                                                          
30 See id. 
31 See id.
32 See Docket No. 103 at ¶ 20. 
33 See Docket Nos. 10, 12.
34 See Chandler, 598 F.3d at 1122. 
35 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109-10 (1998); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2000).
36 McCarthy v. U.S., 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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of the litigation.”37  “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the 
defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss,” the court “‘presumes that general 
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”38  “At all times 
the threshold question of standing ‘is distinct from the merits of a claim’ and does not require 
‘analysis of the merits.’”39  All disputes of fact are resolved in favor of the nonmovant.40    
III. 
 To establish Article III standing, it is the plaintiff’s burden41 to “show (1) it has suffered an 
‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is 
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.”42  Because Plaintiffs fail to satisfy all three prongs, they lack standing to pursue their 
claims.   
First, Plaintiffs have no evidence of concrete, particularized and actual or imminent 
“injury-in-fact” because they no longer allege that the battery-and-bandwidth -using transmission 
containing personal information ever occurs from Plaintiffs’ phones.43  Plaintiffs also do not allege 
                                                          
37 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561. 
38 See id. (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)). 
39 In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., Case No. 12-cv-01382-PSG, 2014 WL 3707508, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) (quoting Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068). 
40 Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1996). 
41 See Chandler, 598 F.3d at 1122.
42 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). 
43 See Docket No. 108-4 at 16; Docket No. 108-6, Ex. D at 83, 85; Docket No. 108-6, Ex. B at 4 
(affirming that no personal information is transmitted to Google or anyone else in the purchase 
process).
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that any battery-and-bandwidth-using transmission ever went to a third party.44  The app purchase 
process involves transmissions only to or from Google.45  While Plaintiffs allege that for a period 
of time it was possible for developers to look up the record of a particular transaction on a Google 
server and also access the user’s email and rough address,46 mere risk of future disclosure is not an 
Article III injury-in-fact.  In Low v. LinkedIn Corp., the court specifically rejected allegations of 
the risk of future disclosures as “insufficient to establish an injury-in-fact that is concrete and 
particularized, as well as actual and imminent.”47  With no allegation of dissemination or improper 
receipt of information, any profit or loss made from any alleged disclosure, let alone a potential 
disclosure, is “conjectural.”48  With no allegation of “appreciable and actual” harm,49 Plaintiffs 
allege no injury-in-fact. 
 Pointing to the Ninth Circuit’s recent unpublished opinion in In re Facebook Privacy 
Litigation,50 Plaintiffs argue they have standing under two theories of injury-in-fact in addition to 
battery and bandwidth use:  economic injury resulting from Google’s providing access to 
                                                          
44 See Docket No. 103 at ¶¶ 136, 147; 170-171; see also Docket No. 105-10 at ¶ 10. 
45 See Docket No. 103 at ¶¶ 136, 147; 170-171; see also Docket No. 105-10 at ¶ 10. 
46 See Docket No. 103 at ¶¶ 136, 141, 144, 166, 168, 172. 
47 See Low v. LinkedIn Corp., Case No. 11-cv-01468-LHK, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 11, 2011) (citing Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F. 3d 955, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2009)) (finding 
lack of standing because of the “conjectural and hypothetical nature” of the alleged injury). 
48 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. 
49 Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 380 F. App’x 689, 691–92 (9th Cir. 2010). 
50 See In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 572 F. App’x, 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished).  Under 9th 
Cir. R. 36-3, this decision is not binding precedent. See also In re Google Android Consumer 
Privacy Litig., Case No. 11-md-02264-JSW, 2013 WL 1283236, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 26, 2013) 
(finding no Article III standing, notwithstanding allegations of improper access to and use of 
personal information, where plaintiffs “do not allege they attempted to sell their personal 
information, that they would do so in the future, or that they were foreclosed from entering into a 
value for value transaction relating to their [personally identifying information], as a result of the 
Google Defendants’ conduct.”). 
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Plaintiffs’ personal information to third parties, and the non-economic harm associated with the 
very fact of this access.51  In Facebook, the complaint alleged that Facebook transmitted to 
advertisers both the user’s Facebook user id and the page the user was viewing at the time, which 
advertisers could then combine with the information on the user’s Facebook page to assemble a 
comprehensive dossier.52  The plaintiffs affirmatively pled both that there was a “robust” market 
for that information and that plaintiffs had been financially harmed by Facebook usurping their 
ability to sell that information themselves.53  Judge Ware dismissed the claim on a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion based on Facebook’s argument that it had in fact not interfered with the plaintiffs’ ability to 
sell their own personal information.54  The Ninth Circuit reversed because the plaintiffs had indeed 
alleged that they were harmed “by the dissemination of their personal information and by losing 
the sales value of that information.”55
 Plaintiffs cite their expert Fernando Torres’s report to show an analysis of what third parties 
would pay for a consumer database containing identifying information for mass marketing 
purposes.56  Torres analyzed the value of the information made available by Google to app 
developers from several perspectives.  First, Torres concludes that the information disclosed by 
Google has economic value, which class members have lost.57  To estimate this, he analyzed and 
quantified what third parties would pay for a consumer data base containing this information, for 
                                                          
51 See Docket No. 108-4 at 9. 
52 See In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 708 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
53 Id. at 708-09. 
54 See id. at 718. 
55 In re Facebook Litig., 572 F. App’x at 494. 
56 See Docket No. 108-4 at 13; Docket No. 108-6, Ex. A at ¶¶ 16(a), 17, 29(b)(i). 
57 See Docket No. 108-6, Ex. A at ¶¶12, 16(a), 17, 29(b)(i). 
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mass marketing purposes.58  He also analyzed and quantified the amount of revenue that third 
parties could realize from the use of this information.59  Torres further explained that “[b]ecause 
Google has disclosed this information to the application developers, the members of the Subclass 
have lost the sales value of that information that they otherwise would have had.”60  In addition, 
Torres concludes that the class members are injured because they have a quantifiable interest in 
protecting the privacy of the information that Google discloses to app developers.61
 There is just one problem with Torres’s various conclusions:  they are not reflected 
anywhere in the CTAC.  Plaintiffs do not allege economic injury from any dissemination—or any 
dissemination at all62—or any injury in the form of loss of the Plaintiffs’ ability to sell their own 
information or its market value.63  Plaintiffs plead neither the existence of a market for their email 
addresses and names nor any impairment of their ability to participate in that market.  Indeed, the 
                                                          
58 See id. at ¶¶ 16(a), 17, 29(b)(i). 
59 See id. at ¶¶ 22-24, 29(b)(iii). 
60 Id. at ¶ 14. 
61 See id. at ¶¶19-21, 29(b)(ii). 
62 See, e.g., Docket No. 103 at ¶¶ 148; 173-174; 318. 
63 See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 146-151.  The mere misappropriation of personal information, without a 
resultant economic harm—for example in the form of being deprived of the ability to monetize that 
information—is neither damage nor injury-in-fact.  See LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., Case No. 
10-cv-1256-GW, 2011 WL 1661532, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (“[T]he Complaint does not 
identify a single individual who was foreclosed from entering into a ‘value-for-value exchange’ . . . 
. Plaintiffs do not explain how they were ‘deprived’ of the economic value of their personal 
information”); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 328-29 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (“[E]ven if [plaintiffs’] privacy interests were indeed infringed by the data transfer, such a 
harm does not amount to a diminishment of the quality or value of a materially valuable interest in 
their personal information.”); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 525 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Demographic information is constantly collected on all consumers . . . . [W]e 
are unaware of any court that has held the value of this collected information constitutes damage to 
consumers”); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) 
(“[D]efendants’ practices do not deprive any of the [plaintiffs] of any value their individual names 
may possess.”).  
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named Plaintiffs freely publish their names and email addresses through their work websites.64  If 
disclosure did occur, then, it would not constitute injury.  Even if Plaintiffs’ complaint need not 
show any proof of deprivation of the opportunity to sell their personal information to anyone,65
Plaintiffs still need to make a pleading, and they do not. 
Second, Plaintiffs’ claim of battery and bandwidth depletion has no nexus to Google’s 
alleged breach or unfair competition.  It is certainly alleged that each time a user purchases an app 
from Google Play, there are transmissions back and forth between the user’s device and Google’s 
servers.66  Those transmissions may include the process of browsing the Play catalog to select an 
App, sending a request to purchase an App and downloading the App once purchased.67  But 
Plaintiffs do not allege those transmissions contain any personal information.68  And while the 
parties do not dispute that a record of sale is logged in the user’s Google Wallet records, the 
identifying information at issue is already a part of Google Wallet, provided by the user in the 
process of opening the account.69  Plaintiffs concede that the transmission of data “consists not of 
the user’s actual name and email address in human-readable form but, instead, [application 
program interface] calls or messages providing certain computer-readable device- and user-specific 
                                                          
64 See Docket No. 108-4 at 110-111. 
65 See Svenson v. Google Inc., Case No. 13-cv-04080-BLF, Docket. No. 118, at 2, 8-9 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 1, 2015) (alleging a market for personal information she alleged to be transmitted, and 
alleging loss of the opportunity to participate in that market.  Concerning Google Wallet and 
Google Play, Svenson alleged that each App purchase involves the transmission of “Packets 
Contents” that are transmitted “in packets sent by Plaintiff and the class to Defendants,” and 
contain “personal information about Buyers, including credit card information, purchase 
authorization, addresses, zip codes, names, phone numbers, email addresses, and/or other 
information.”) (quoting complaint). 
66 See Docket No. 115 at 7. 
67 See id. 
68 See Docket No. 103 at ¶ 136. 
69 See, e.g., Docket No. 108-6, Ex. B at 4.
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data.”70  Put another way, the loss of battery life or use of bandwidth is not “fairly traceable to the 
challenged action” as the downloading of the app occurs before any record of the transaction or 
making available of information for look-up.   
Third, any injury is not redressable by a favorable decision.  No past or future change to 
merchant queries or receipt of information would alter the battery or bandwidth consumed in 
purchasing an app.  Google no longer makes names and email addresses visible in response to 
Wallet or Play merchant queries, nor could there be any claim that the amount of battery power 
used in purchasing an App changed one iota as a result.  Even if tomorrow this court ordered 
Google to cease making any transaction data whatsoever available to the developers from whom 
users purchase apps, it would not change the battery and bandwidth use of the purchase process at 
all.71
     IV.
 Google’s fourth motion to dismiss is GRANTED, without further leave to amend.   
Plaintiffs have amended their complaint no less than four times,72 and given that discovery is now 
                                                          
70 See Docket No. 108-4 at 16; See Docket No. 108-6, Ex. D at 85, 83; Docket No. 108-6, Ex. B. at 
4.
71 To the extent that Plaintiffs’ most recent complaint also seeks tort damages for invasion of 
privacy in relation to their contract damages, the court has already dismissed Plaintiffs’ intrusion 
upon seclusion claim with prejudice.  See Docket No. 85.  This district sets a high bar for the 
requisite intrusion that is highly offensive to a reasonable person. See In re iPhone Application 
Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  Intrusion upon seclusion, just like any other 
invasion of privacy tort, requires conduct that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”
Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 780, 786 (2006), rev’d on other grounds, 47 Cal. 4th 
272 (2009); see also Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 36-37 (1994) (holding 
invasion of privacy rights must be “sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or 
potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy 
right.”).  Plaintiffs have pled no such conduct, and in any event, their claims are based on the 
allegedly improper sharing of basic address information that each of them freely shared with 
Google in the first place. 
72 See Docket Nos. 45, 67, 85, 101. 
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closed, any further amendment introducing yet another theory of injury at this late date would be 
unfairly prejudicial to Google.73
SO ORDERED.
Dated:  July 15, 2015                          
 _________________________________ 
   PAUL S. GREWAL 
   United States Magistrate Judge 
                                                          
73 See Docket No. 92; Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)) (listing grounds for dismissing with 
prejudice).
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